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Abstract. A logically impossible sentence is one which entails a contradiction, 
a  logically necessary sentence is one whose negation entails a  contradiction, 
and a logically possible sentence is one which does not entail a contradiction. 
metaphysically impossible, necessary and possible sentences are ones which 
become logically impossible, necessary, or possible by substituting what I call 
informative rigid designators for uninformative ones. It does seem very strongly 
that a negative existential sentence cannot entail a contradiction, and so ‘there 
is a God’ cannot be a metaphysically necessary truth. If it were such a  truth, 
innumerable other sentences which seem paradigm examples of logically 
possible sentences, such as ‘no one knows everything’ would turn out to be 
logically impossible. The only way in which God could be a logically necessary 
being is if there were eternal necessary propositions independent of human 
language or God’s will, such that the proposition that there is no God would 
entail – via propositions inaccessible to us – a contradiction. but if there were 
such propositions, God would have less control over the universe than he would 
have otherwise.
I.
I  shall understand by ‘metaphysical necessity’ the strongest kind of 
necessity there is, and by ‘metaphysical impossibility’ the strongest kind 
of impossibility there is, and so by ‘metaphysical possibility’ the weakest 
kind of possibility there is. my concern in this paper is with whether it 
is metaphysically possible that God be a metaphysically necessary being 
in these senses.
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A substance or event is metaphysically necessary (or whatever) iff it 
is metaphysically necessary (or whatever) that it exists; and since we can 
have no discussable knowledge of whether it is metaphysically necessary 
(or whatever) that the substance or event exists, except (at least in part) 
by reflecting on features of the sentence which asserts this, it will be 
more convenient to speak of necessity etc. as belonging to the sentence. 
I shall come back later to the issue of whether these modal properties 
belong primarily to entities of some other kind, such as propositions, 
and consider the consequences which would follow if they did. 
I  begin with general considerations about what determines the 
meanings, in the sense of the truth conditions, of the sentences of 
a  human language, that is the conditions in which they are true and 
the conditions in which they are false and so which other sentences 
they entail and are entailed by. sentences of a  language mean what its 
speakers (or – in the case of technical terms – some group of experts, 
e.g. physicists) mean by them. each of us learns the meanings of certain 
sentences by being shown many observable conditions under which 
those sentences are regarded as true or as false, and by being told of 
other sentences to which a speaker is regarded as committed by uttering 
those sentences, and other sentences which are such that someone who 
utters them is regarded as committed to the former sentences. We learn 
the meaning of a word by being taught the difference to the meaning 
of a sentence made by that word playing a certain role in the sentence. 
by being taught the meanings of individual words and of sentences of 
various forms, we may then come to an understanding of the meaning of 
a sentence in which those words are arranged in a certain way, even if we 
have not been shown observable conditions under which that sentence is 
regarded as true or as false. showing ‘observable conditions’ may involve 
pointing to them or describing them by terms already introduced. For 
example, we learn the meaning of ‘there is a  cat over there’ by being 
shown observable circumstances under which this sentence is regarded 
as true, and observable circumstances under which it is regarded 
as false; and by being told that someone who utters this sentence is 
regarded as committed to ‘there is an animal over there’, and someone 
who utters ‘there are two cats over there’ is regarded as committed to 
the original sentence. We learn the meaning of ‘there is a dog over there’ 
in a  similar way. Thereby we come to know the meanings of ‘cat’ and 
‘dog’, and so the kind of meaning possessed by sentences of the form 
‘there is a Φ over there.’ We need to observe many different examples of 
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observable conditions under which a sentence containing a certain word 
in various roles is regarded as true or false, and of the commitments 
speakers who use sentences containing that word in various roles are 
regarded as having; and this allows us to acquire an understanding of the 
conditions under which some new sentence containing that word would 
be regarded as true or false. examples of different observable conditions 
under which some sentence is true or false, and of sentences to which we 
are not committed by a given sentence also illustrate which conditions 
do not rule out the sentence being true. We extrapolate, that is, from 
a  stock of supposedly paradigm examples (of observable conditions 
and relations of  commitment) to an  understanding that the sentence 
would be regarded as true (or false, as the case may be) under conditions 
sufficiently similar in certain respects to most of the paradigm examples.1
because humans have very similar psychologies determining how they 
learn meanings, and because members of a language group are exposed 
to very similar paradigm examples (of observable conditions and rules 
of commitment), members of the same language group normally acquire 
a very similar understanding of the meanings of words and sentences. 
This common understanding may be reinforced by dictionary compilers 
and philosophers who ‘tidy up’ language by laying down rules for correct 
usage, usually by codifying most people’s actual usage. The rules give 
general descriptions of the observable conditions under which various 
sentences of the language are true and of the observable conditions under 
which various sentences of the language are false, and of the kinds of other 
sentences to which a sentence of a given kind commits the speaker and 
by which sentences of other kinds a speaker is committed to a sentence of 
a given kind. The rules of the syllogism for example are rules of this latter 
kind; ‘all A’s are b’ and ‘All b’s are C’ commits one to ‘All A’s are C’. but 
such rules can in the end only be understood by examples of observable 
‘conditions’ and ‘kinds’ of sentences. one couldn’t understand the stated 
rule of the syllogism without being shown some things which have some 
property, and some things which have another property, and examples 
of things which constitute ‘all’ members of a class. This programme of 
1 Note however that the sense of a word which we get from this process may be such as 
to rule out a few of the supposedly paradigm examples as examples of things to which that 
word applies. Thus we may derive from many supposedly paradigm examples by which 
we are taught the meaning of the word ‘cat’ a sense of ‘cat’ which rules out one of these 
examples as being a cat at all; it might turn out to have been a baby tiger instead. I ask the 
reader to understand future uses of ‘paradigm’ as short for ‘supposedly paradigm’.
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‘tidying up’ language aims to secure uniformity of use. To the extent 
to which it is successful in a  language group, there is a  correct use of 
language, and it is an objective matter to what one is and to what one is 
not committed by some sentence.
Words and sentence forms may be ambiguous, and new words and 
sentence forms enter language; but I shall count the language as having 
a correct use, so long as speakers can be got to recognise the ambiguity or 
novel meaning. This can often be achieved by philosophical discussion 
forcing a speaker to admit that in one sense of a word ‘W’, ‘s is W’ is 
true, whereas in another sense ‘s is W’ is false. because of a  lack of 
sensory or cognitive apparatus, some speakers do not have the capacity 
to extrapolate from any paradigm examples or inferential rules to the 
applicability of sentences in new situations. some people are colour-
blind, and so unable to understand the sense of ‘green’ to which they 
have been introduced by examples of green objects and so apply it to new 
instances. other people do not have the cognitive apparatus to recognize 
some philosophical or mathematical concept such as ‘tensor product’ or 
‘internal negation’, to which they have been introduced, and so apply it to 
new instances. but so long as those who purport to be able to extrapolate 
from paradigm examples can be got to agree how to do so, I shall count 
the expressions as having an objective meaning in the language. I shall 
call the assumption that all sentences of the language would have, in 
consequence of these procedures, an objective meaning, the ‘common 
language assumption’. I  shall call a  rule for what one is objectively 
committed to by a sentence, a rule of mini-entailment. s1 mini-entails s2 
if and only if anyone who asserts s1 is thereby (in virtue of the rules for 
the correct use of language) committed to s2. s1 entails sn iff they can be 
joined by a chain of mini-entailments, such that s1 mini-entails some s2, 
s2 mini-entails some s3 and so on until we reach a sentence which mini-
entails sn. I shall call a rule for what one is objectively not-committed to 
by a sentence or its negation a compatibility rule. s1 is compatible with 
s2 iff s1 does not entail not-s2. If a sentence s1 is compatible with s2, it is 
of course compatible with all the entailments of s2.
II.
Among metaphysical necessities etc. are ones discoverable a priori, that 
is discoverable by mere reflection on what is involved in the claim made 
by the sentence. I’ll call these logical necessities etc. (They include both 
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‘logical’ necessities etc. in a  narrow sense, and ‘conceptual’ necessities 
etc.) The obvious examples by which we learn the meaning of ‘logically 
impossible sentence’ are self-contradictory sentences and ones which 
entail self-contradictions. A self-contradictory sentence claims both that 
something is so and also that it is not so, for example, ‘he is taller than 
6ft and it is not the case that he is taller than 6 ft.’ For such a sentence 
could only be true if that something was so, and the sentence asserts 
that it is not so. No sentence could be more obviously or more strongly 
impossible than such a sentence; and any sentence which entails a self-
contradiction is as strongly impossible as a  self-contradiction. And 
the natural understanding which most of us get from these examples 
is that a  logically impossible sentence just is one which entails a  self-
contradiction; and so any logically necessary sentence is one whose 
negation entails a self-contradiction, and any logically possible sentence 
is one which does not entail a self-contradiction.
Purported examples of logically necessary sentences whose negations 
do not entail a self-contradiction, turn out, I suggest, on examination, 
either to be such that their negations do entail a  self-contradiction or 
not to be nearly as strongly necessary as ones whose negations entail 
a  self-contradiction.2 And there is a  general reason for denying that 
2 robert Adams has one example of what, he writes, “seems to be a necessary truth”: 
“everything green has some spatial property”. (see robert Adams, ‘Divine Necessity’ 
republished in his The Virtue of Faith [oxford: oxford university Press, 1987], pp. 
213-4.) He claims that this sentence cannot be shown to be ‘analytic’. ‘Analytic’ may be 
understood in different ways, but one way which Adams mentions is being true “solely in 
virtue of the meanings of its terms”; and he claims that this account is “so vague as to be 
useless”. but if ‘analytic’ is spelled out in terms of the negation of the sentence entailing 
a self-contradiction, the notion is clear. I suggest that being ‘green’ can be understood 
in two possible ways, and that the cited sentence with ‘green’ understood in either of 
these ways can be shown to be such that its negation entails a self-contradiction. being 
green is a property of a thing. one can understand the word ‘green’ in such a way that 
a thing being ‘green’ entails that thing being a publicly visible thing. A publicly visible 
thing must have a spatial extension – for what one sees one sees as occupying a region of 
space. In that case the negation of the cited sentence clearly entails a self-contradiction. 
but one can understand ‘green’ in a sense in which (not merely a public visible thing, 
but also) a private thing experienced by only one person, the content of a mental event 
such as a sense-datum (or, less controversially, an after-image), could be ‘green’. Clearly 
what it would be for that private thing to be green is to have the same visual appearance 
in respect of colour as a  green public object. It must look like a  surface or a  volume 
which is green; and so must have the visual appearance of a spatial thing. For a private 
object to have a visual appearance of a spatial thing entails it looking as if it occupies 
a region of public space, and it can only do that if it occupies a spatial region of one’s 
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there are any logically impossible sentences other than ones which 
entail a self-contradiction (that is, any sentences which are as strongly 
impossible as those which entail a  self-contradiction, and whose 
impossibility is detectable a priori, but which do not themselves entail 
a self-contradiction). The reason is that any such sentence must have the 
form of a declarative sentence, in which the component words already 
have a  sense in the language. It will be a  subject-predicate sentence, 
an  existential generalization, or some other one of many recognized 
forms of declarative sentence. It will – to put the point loosely – assert 
something about some substance or property or event or whatever that it 
has or does not have some property or relation to some other substance, 
property, etc.; or that there are or are not certain substances, properties 
or whatever. Words have a  sense in so far as it is clear what are the 
criteria for an object, property or whatever to be that object, property 
or whatever – they therefore delimit a  boundary to the sort of object 
or property it can be or the sort of properties it can have. Hence it will 
be inconsistent to affirm that an object picked out by some expression 
is of a kind ruled out by the very criteria for being that object. And the 
form of a  sentence s1 will exclude some alternative s2; and so it will 
be inconsistent to affirm (s1 & s2). It follows therefore that sentences 
exemplifying what used to be called ‘category mistakes’, e.g. ‘Caesar is 
a prime number’ or ‘this memory is violet’3 are – in my sense – logically 
impossible sentences. If a sentence is not impossible for these reasons, 
then it will be making a  claim about the world which does not entail 
a self-contradiction, a coherent claim. And plausibly no coherent claim 
can be as strongly impossible as a self-contradictory claim.
Given the common language assumption, we should all be able to 
agree – within a finite time – about many sentences that they entail self-
contradictions, and so are logically impossible; and about many sentences 
that they are such that their negations entail self-contradictions, and so 
are logically necessary. Compatibility rules also allow us to recognize 
many logically possible sentences; and so, since any sentence entailed 
visual field. so again, even if one allows the existence of private objects which are green, 
the negation of ‘everything green has some spatial property’ entails a self-contradiction. 
Adams’s example does not disconfirm my claim that the logically necessary is simply that 
the negation of which entails a self-contradiction, and that similar equivalences hold for 
logical possibility and impossibility.
3 I  take these examples from the article on ‘category mistake’ by Jack meiland in 
r. Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1999), p. 123.
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by a  logically possible sentence is itself logically possible, to recognize 
many more logically possible sentences. of course a  philosophical 
discussion often begins with disagreement about what entails what or 
what is compatible with what. The way to resolve a disagreement about 
whether p entails q  is to find a route of mini-entailments from p  to q, 
or – alternatively – a  route of mini-entailments from (p  & not-q) to 
a  self-contradiction. The way to resolve disagreements about whether 
p  is logically possible is to find some sentence (normally some long 
conjunction describing a  circumstance) which disputants agree to be 
logically possible, which entails p), or to find some self-contradiction 
entailed by p. but prolonged failure to resolve disagreements in these 
ways is evidence of a failure in the common language assumption. That 
failure would mean that the examples and rules by which a  word or 
sentence form has been given a  sense has led to different unshareable 
concepts, different incommunicable understandings of that word or 
sentence form by different disputants. This may happen either because 
the two groups differ in their sensory life or in their cognitive abilities.
Here is one example. suppose that the only noises humans could hear 
were noises produced by strings vibrating with different frequencies; and 
they then describe the noises produced by the more frequent vibrations 
as having a higher ‘pitch’. The two groups might have two very different 
concepts of higher ‘pitch’. one group’s concept of a higher pitch might be 
simply the concept of being caused by a string vibrating more frequently; 
‘higher pitch’ means more vibrations. The other group’s concept might 
be that of a quality of a noise contingently caused by string vibration. 
both groups would allow that everyone normally judges correctly which 
strings are vibrating more frequently, but that sometimes members of 
both groups make mistakes. Yet the two groups would describe the 
‘mistakes’ differently. For the first group the mistakes are simply (bare) 
mistakes about how frequently the strings are vibrating, while for the 
second group the mistakes are mistakes caused by vibrations occasionally 
causing notes of different pitch from the ones they normally cause. For the 
first group the ‘deaf ’ lack an ability to discriminate vibrations by means of 
their ears; for the second group the ‘deaf ’ lack an ability to have auditory 
sensations. The different concepts of ‘pitch’ have different entailments. 
For the first group ‘the string is now vibrating more frequently’ entails ‘it 
is producing a higher note’: for the second group, it does not. And so on. 
The first group reports that it ‘cannot make sense of ’ much of what the 
second group is claiming.
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The difference in the concepts inculcated by the teaching process 
may have arisen because the second group has sensations which the first 
group doesn’t have. (The first group suffer from the auditory equivalent 
of blindsight.) but it may have arisen from a cognitive failure on the part 
of one or other group. It may be that both groups have sensations, but 
the first group doesn’t have the ability to distinguish its sensations from 
its beliefs. or it may be that neither group has sensations, but the second 
group suppose that they must be having sensations because they convince 
themselves from the example of vision that all perceptual beliefs must be 
mediated by sensations. 
A different kind of example shows how lack of cognitive abilities alone 
may lead to different concepts. We are all taught by the same kinds of 
example what is a ‘straight line’. some people come to understand thereby 
simply a line (which can be extended indefinitely) such that the shortest 
distance between any two points on the line lies on the line, however far 
the line is extended. but others, while allowing that as a possible meaning 
for ‘straight line’ may acquire a  more sophisticated understanding, 
that a  ‘straight line’ is a line (which can be extended indefinitely) such 
that for any point P on the line there is some point Q on the line such 
that the shortest distance between P  and any point on the line closer 
to P than Q lies on the line. This second understanding allows for the 
possibility of all straight lines (in this second sense) eventually returning 
to their starting point, and so there being no straight lines in the first 
sense, and so of space being unbounded but closed. some people simply 
‘cannot make sense’ of this possibility; for them being a ‘straight line’ in 
the second sense entails being a  ‘straight line’ in the first sense. other 
people can make sense of this possibility, and so deny the entailment. 
And, although I myself can make sense of it, it is always (epistemically) 
possible that I am deceived.
The only way to attempt to overcome such conflicts is to continue to 
pursue the methods described earlier – try harder to agree on logically 
possible sentences which entail a disputed sentence, or to find a route by 
which it leads to a self-contradiction. but it may be that some of us simply 
lack the ability to recognize certain modal truths, or – alternatively – 
deceive ourselves into supposing that certain sentences are logically 
possible, when they are not. but where this doesn’t happen, there will 
be agreement about what is logically impossible etc., so long as we have 
the same understanding of the ‘logically impossible’ as that which entails 
a self-contradiction.
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III.
but not all metaphysical impossibilities or necessities are logical 
impossibilities or necessities. In the 1970’s, Kripke and Putnam4 drew our 
attention to the fact that there are many sentences which are such that 
neither they nor their negations seem to entail any self-contradiction, but 
which seem to be necessarily true or necessarily false with a necessity as 
strong as that of logical necessity, but whose truth or falsity are discoverable 
only a  posteriori. These sentences were said to be metaphysically but 
not logically, necessary or impossible. Thus, to modify an example used 
by Kripke to illustrate this class of sentences, suppose that in days long 
before people knew the geography of the Himalayas, explorers named 
a mountain of a certain visual appearance seen from Tibet ‘everest’, and 
a mountain of a certain different shape seen from Nepal ‘Gaurisanker’, 
and used these names as rigid designators of the mountains. (A  ‘rigid 
designator’ is a  word which picks out the same object, however the 
object may change in respect of its non-essential properties.) These 
mountains are the same mountain; and being the mountains they are, 
they are – by the necessity of identity – necessarily the same mountain; 
and so – it seems – ‘everest is Gaurisanker’ is necessarily true, with as 
hard as necessity as any logically necessary sentence. However – we 
may suppose – the explorers did not know this, and clearly would not 
have been able to discover its truth by mere a priori means. Hence it is 
not a logically necessary truth. or consider Putnam’s example of ‘water 
is H2o’, ‘water’ being understood – as Putnam supposes that it was in 
the early nineteenth century – as a rigid designator of the transparent 
drinkable liquid in our rivers and seas. What makes the stuff that stuff 
is its chemical essence – being H2o. Having that essence, it could not 
not have that essence. so ‘water is H2o’ is metaphysically necessary, 
but again not so discoverable a priori. Hence is must be an a posteriori 
metaphysical necessity. 
What has made these necessary sentences a  posteriori is that the 
sentence contains at least one rigid designator of which we learn 
the meaning by being told that it applies to certain particular things 
4 saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, republished as a  book (oxford: blackwell, 1980), 
and H. Putnam, ‘The meaning of “meaning”’, republished in his Mind, Language and Reality, 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1975). I  interpret the 
claims of Kripke and Putnam about necessity etc. as claims about the necessity of sentences. 
Kripke makes it clear that his concern is with sentences, and writes that he has no ‘official 
doctrine’ of how his account applies to ‘propositions’. (op. cit. pp. 20-21.)
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(especially substances and kinds of substances) having certain superficial 
properties, but where – we are told – what makes a thing that thing (that 
substance or a substance of that kind) is the essence (of which we may be 
ignorant) underlying those properties. In ignorance of the latter, we do 
not fully understand what we are saying about a substance when we say 
that it is that substance or a substance of that kind. Hence I shall call such 
designators ‘uninformative designators’.
I define a rigid designator of a  thing as an  ‘informative designator’ 
if and only if someone who knows what the designator means (that is, 
has the linguistic knowledge of how to use it) knows a  certain set of 
conditions necessary and sufficient (in any logically possible world) for 
a thing to be that thing (whether or not he can state those conditions in 
words.) I define a rigid designator as an ‘uninformative designator’ if and 
only if these conditions are not satisfied. To ‘know’ these conditions for 
the application of a designator – as I shall understand this expression – 
just is to be able (when favourably positioned, with faculties in working 
order, and not subject to illusion) to recognize where the informative 
designator (or, if it is defined in words, the words by which it is defined) 
applies and where it does not and to know the mini-entailments of 
sentences in which it occurs. Having the ability to recognize something 
when favourably positioned with faculties in working order and not 
subject to illusion, involves knowing what that thing is. In the case of 
technical terms, it is experts in the relevant field whose knowledge of the 
relevant necessary and sufficient conditions determines the meaning of 
a  term. Thus it is physical scientists, whose knowledge determines the 
meanings of ‘quark’ or ‘electron’.
many of the words – for example ‘red’, ‘square’, ‘has a length of 1 metre’ 
– by which we pick out properties are informative designators; they are 
such that if we know what the words mean we can recognize (subject 
to the stated restriction) where they do or do not apply, and can make 
the requisite inferences. other words by which we pick out properties 
can be defined by words for which those conditions hold. For example 
‘has a length of 10-15 metres’ can be defined in terms of the informatively 
designated property ‘has a  length of 10 metres’ and the informatively 
designated relation of ‘being shorter by 1/10th than’ (used 15 times).
so the reason why the claims originally made by the sentences 
‘everest is Gaurisanker’ and ‘water is H2o’ are necessary with as hard 
a necessity as ‘logical necessity’ is that they are logically necessary, but 
the use of uninformative designators has the consequences that speakers 
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did not know fully what these claims were until they had done some 
a  posteriori investigation. When we know fully what we are talking 
about, mere a  priori considerations can show whether some sentence 
is metaphysically necessary or impossible. Hence there is available 
a  definition of a  sentence as metaphysically necessary (impossible or 
possible) iff it is logically necessary (impossible or possible) when we 
substitute co-referring informative designators for uninformative 
designators. This definition will capture as metaphysically necessary 
(impossible or possible) almost all the examples of the ‘metaphysically 
necessary’ (‘impossible’ or ‘possible’) offered by Kripke, Putnam, and 
others. And so from these examples we derive a sense of metaphysically 
necessary in which a sentence is metaphysically necessary (impossible 
or possible) iff it is logically necessary (impossible or possible) when 
informative designators are substituted for uninformative designators. 
And so, given the earlier understanding of ‘logical impossibility’, and 
the understanding of metaphysical impossibility as in reality logical 
impossibility, it would seem that no sentence could be as strongly 
impossible metaphysically as one which is in reality logically impossible; 
and so there can be no metaphysically impossible (necessary, or possible) 
sentences apart from ones of the kind analysed in this section.
IV.
so, given some a posteriori logically contingent information (e.g. about 
which are the molecules of which whatever is the transparent stuff 
in our rivers and seas is made) which determine which sentences are 
metaphysically necessary, there should be no scope for disagreement 
about the modal metaphysical status of any sentence – given that the 
common language assumption applies to the words and sentence forms 
of the language – and that we have the same understandings of ‘logical’ 
and ‘metaphysical’ impossibility. 
Now I  have introduced the term ‘metaphysically’ impossible as the 
strongest kind of impossibility which a  sentence can have; and defined 
the ‘logically’ impossible in terms of the metaphysically impossible. I have 
filled out what it is for a sentence to be impossible in this ‘strongest’ sense 
by examples of self-contradictions, entailments, and compatibilities; and 
by means of Kripke – Putnam type examples, which I  have described 
in my own way by means of the concept of an  ‘informative designator’. 
The particular examples could form the basis of any philosophy student’s 
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introduction to the concepts of metaphysical and logical impossibility. From 
these examples I have derived sharp usable senses of ‘logically impossible’ 
(‘entailing a contradiction’) and ‘metaphysically impossible’ (reducible in 
the stated way to ‘logically impossible’), and thereby of the other modal 
concepts. I call these senses of the terms ‘logically’ and ‘metaphysically’ the 
narrow senses, and I will assume them for the rest of this section.
others may purport to derive from the paradigm examples wider 
understandings of these terms. They may suppose (for example) that 
there are impossibilities in the strongest sense detectable a priori which 
do not entail contradictions; or necessities in the strongest sense which 
do not reduce to sentences whose negations entail contradictions when 
we substitute informative for uninformative designators.5 The issue then 
arises whether it is logically possible (on my understanding of this concept) 
for there to be such impossibilities or necessities. And the only way to 
resolve any disagreement about this is by the methods described earlier: 
putting forward examples which we can both recognize do not entail 
self-contradictions, or showing by a route that we can both recognize that 
purported examples do entail self-contradictions. but I  am pessimistic 
about the chances of my reaching agreement with many of my opponents 
on this matter within any finite time. That will show that one or other of 
us suffers from some (sensory, or much more likely) cognitive deficiency.
V.
However, given my understanding of these concepts together with 
my assumption that the modal properties are properties of sentences, it 
seems fairly implausible to suppose that a (positive) existential sentence 
(a  sentence claiming that there exists some thing or things of a  certain 
5 Gendler and Hawthorne write, that “the notion of metaphysical possibility ... is 
standardly taken to be primitive”, adding in a  footnote “in contemporary discussions 
at any rate” ([eds] T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility [oxford: 
oxford university Press, 2002], Introduction, p. 4.). It doesn’t help me to understand this 
notion for them to say that it is the most basic conception of ‘how things might have been’ 
(ibid. pp. 4-5.). For since this ‘most basic conception’ is supposed to be wider than logical 
possibility (as defined by me), it is unclear how the latter is to be widened unless in the 
way I have analysed. (In one book I myself unhelpfully used ‘metaphysically necessary’ 
to mean [roughly] whatever is the ultimate cause of things or is entailed by the existence 
of that ultimate cause; and so the ‘metaphysically possible’ is whatever is compatible 
with the existence of the actual ultimate cause. see The Christian God [oxford: oxford 
university Press, 1994], pp. 118-19. but this is certainly not the sense which most writers 
who use the term have in mind, and not the sense in which I am using in this paper.)
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kind) can be logically necessary – for to be so it would need to be such 
that its negation entails a self-contradiction. The negation of an existential 
sentence has the form ‘~(Ǝx)(ϕx)’; it claims that a  certain property (or 
conjunction of properties) is not instantiated. A  self-contradictory 
sentence, of a kind not containing modal operators, claims that the actual 
world has a contradictory quality, and that will be so either because some 
object within it has such a quality or because it both does and does not 
contain an  object of a  certain kind. so it will have the form or entail 
a  sentence of the form ‘(Ǝx)(ψx)&~(Ǝx)(ψx)’ or the form ‘(Ǝx) (ψ x & 
~ ψ x)’. either way it will include or entail a positive existential sentence. 
but plausibly the mere non-existence of anything of some kind cannot 
entail the existence of anything. It may be suggested that the contradiction 
has the form of a sentence in which there are modal operators, where the 
contradiction arises from its modal features; for example a sentence of the 
form ‘it is possible that something is ϕ, and it is not possible that something 
is ϕ, ‘◊(Ǝx) (Φx) & ~◊(Ǝx) (Φx)’. but it is not easy to see how the mere 
non-existence of anything of some kind could entail a  modal sentence 
which would not be entailed by the existence of a thing of that kind. 
The plausible suggestion that the mere non-existence of anything of 
some kind cannot entail a contradiction, and so no positive existential 
sentence can be a necessary truth is of course is of course due to Hume.6 
It will hold whether the thing is of a  concrete or an abstract kind. so 
the supposed necessary existential truths of arithmetic do not constitute 
an exception. The negation of, for example, such a supposed necessary 
truth as ‘There are prime numbers greater than 3’, ‘There are no prime 
numbers greater than 3’, does not by itself entail a contradiction; it does 
so only when conjoined with some existential axiom of arithmetic 
(e.g ‘There is a number 1’ and ‘every number has a successor’). so my 
suggestion must hold also for the special case where ‘Ø’ designates any 
conjunction of properties of a  kind supposed to constitute a  definite 
description of God – e.g. ‘omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and 
eternal’ – and so God cannot be a logically necessary being. 
However some people claim (in effect) that a  particular negative 
existential sentence of this kind does entail a contradiction, and some 
of them claim to have demonstrated this. If this disagreement persists 
after serious attempts to clarify the issues, this indicates another case 
6 “There is no being ... whose non-existence implies a  contradiction.” D. Hume, 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, originally published 1779 (New York, Hafner 
Publishing Co., 1948), Part 9, p. 58.
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where my ‘common language assumption’ is mistaken. The entailment 
must depend on understanding sentences in different senses from the 
way the rest of us understand them, senses which are not equivalent to 
any which we can grasp. Yet if someone claims that ‘there is no x such 
that Ø x’ (where ‘Ø’ designates a  definite description of God of any 
traditional kind) entails a  contradiction, they will need to hold that 
innumerable other sentences of very different kinds to each other entail 
contradictions, when the rest of us hold that they are obviously logically 
possible. For example they will need to hold that ‘once upon a  time 
there were no rational beings’, and ‘No one knows everything’, and ‘No 
one is perfectly good’, and – among sentences evidently describing non-
actual worlds – ‘The only substances are four mutually repelling steel 
balls’, and ‘No one knows what is happening outside a sphere of 1 mile 
diameter surrounding their body’ all entail contradictions, because – if 
any one of them does not entail a contradiction – there would not be 
a God in anything like a traditional sense. someone could only derive 
a contradiction from all such sentences if they understood an enormous 
number of predicates – not just one or two technical philosophical 
terms – in different senses from the rest of us, or if they understood one 
or more formal terms such as ‘exists’, ‘not’, or ‘all’ differently from the 
rest of us. In view of the similarity in respect of psychological make-up 
and the process of language acquisition between humans who believe in 
ontological arguments and those who don’t, I do not find it very plausible 
to suppose that the former understand all these predicates in different 
senses from the rest of us. but if they do understand the predicates in 
the same senses as the rest of us, they will have to admit that ‘there is no 
God’ does not entail a self-contradiction, and so ‘there is a God’ cannot 
be logically necessary in the sense in which I have spelled it out.
but if there is no logically necessary sentence of the form ‘there is 
an x such that Øx’ where ‘Ø’ designates a definite description of God, 
no substitution for ‘God’ in ‘God exists’ of a  co-referring designator 
will yield a  logically necessary sentence, and so ‘God exists’ cannot be 
metaphysically necessary in the sense in which I have spelled it out.
VI.
my arguments so far assume that the primary bearers of modal properties 
are sentences of human languages. because many human languages have 
very similar structures to each other – words introduced by the same 
observable circumstances, the same types of sentences (subject-predicate 
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sentences, existential sentences, and so on) with parallel inference 
patterns between them, some sentence in one language often means the 
same as some sentence in another language; they are inter-translatable. 
And so in order to talk about the claim which would be made by any 
such sentence, or any other sentence meaning the same which might be 
uttered in a language not yet invented, it is useful to suppose that – even 
before such a claim is made – there is a common thing which they all 
express, a proposition, the content and logical consequences of which 
can be discussed independently of the particular language in which it 
is expressed. This however is merely a useful fiction. There is no reason 
to suppose that there really are such things as propositions, existing 
independently of the sentences which express them. We cannot interact 
with propositions, nor do we need to postulate them in order to explain 
what we observe – the behaviour of humans who utter sentences. And if 
the necessary truths were truths about eternal propositions, there would 
be no easy explanation of how we are in a position to know which such 
propositions are necessarily true. Why should we trust our intuitions 
about this Platonic realm? Whereas if necessary truths are truths about 
human language, there is a ready explanation of how we are in a position 
to know about them: we learn them in learning language. so there is 
no reason to deny that ordinary talk about ‘propositions’ (of a kind that 
does not imply their eternal existence) can be analysed as talk about 
human sentences. 
If however we suppose that propositions are real timeless entities 
which have a modal status independently of any human sentences which 
might express them, then there is some plausibility in the claim that the 
proposition expressed (imperfectly) by the sentence ‘there is a God’ might 
be a metaphysically necessary truth – even if we assume that logically 
impossible propositions are ones which entail a self-contradiction, and 
metaphysically impossible propositions are ones from which we can 
derive from logically impossible propositions by substituting co-referring 
informative for uninformative designators. For there will not be the 
slightest reason to suppose that there are only as many propositions as 
will eventually be expressed or even (in some sense) could be expressed. 
In that case there would not be any reason to suppose that all necessary 
propositions which can be expressed can be shown by us to be necessary, 
because the demonstrations thereof may depend on a deduction which 
proceeds by means of propositions of kinds which cannot be expressed 
and whose mini-entailments may be known only to superior beings. 
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so maybe ‘God exists’ is necessarily true – even though we humans are 
totally unable to show that. That of course would not provide us with 
a sound ontological argument, but it does allow the possibility of there 
being one, unknowable by humans. 
This way of thinking does however carry certain unwelcome 
consequences for theism. It looks as if all these other necessary propositions 
coexisting eternally with God, constrain how God can act. If for example 
it is a necessarily true proposition that God cannot make me exist or not 
exist at the same time, then this constrains what God can do – not merely 
what we can do with the english language without uttering a necessarily 
false sentence. That necessarily true proposition would limit God. one way 
of attempting to avoid this is to claim that necessarily these propositions 
are ideas in the mind of God, and so part of his nature. but that raises the 
question why these propositions rather than any other ones are part of 
God’s nature, and if the answer is that it is just a brute fact that they are, 
that would make God essentially a very un-simple being. Alternatively 
one could suppose that God has a nature such that necessarily he creates 
just these necessary truths.7 on a normal theistic view God is necessarily 
good, and so the only necessary truths which it follows from his essence 
that he will create will be good ones. but there are well-known difficulties 
in supposing that any agent (including God) can make actions (morally) 
good (except in virtue of some fundamental moral principle which lays 
down which actions an agent can make good under which circumstances 
– e.g. that it is good to use force to uphold a just law if commanded to 
do so by a just sovereign).8 Given that the fundamental principles about 
7 see for example Thomas morris and Christopher menzel ‘Absolute Creation’ in (ed.) 
T. morris, Anselmian Explorations (Notre Dame, Indiana: university of Notre Dame 
Press, 1987), pp. 161-172. The later pages of this paper (pp. 172-8) go on to defend a (to 
my mind) even more implausible correlate of this view – that God creates his own nature. 
8 For example, it does rather look as if some of the same actions would be good or bad 
if there was no God, as are good and bad if there is a God. but if no action would be good 
or bad unless God had so willed it, that must be because God has some property which 
other persons lack (e.g. being our creator, or being omnipotent) so that God’s willing some 
action would make this difference whereas other persons willing it would not. but then 
there must be a fundamental principle independent of God, that it is good to do any action 
willed by someone having that property; and that principle couldn’t be true in virtue of 
being willed by God. For my account of the relation of God to morality see my ‘What 
difference does God make to morality?’ in (ed.) r.K. Garcia, Is Goodness without God 
good enough? (lanham, maryland: rowman and littlefield, 2009), pp. 151-63; and my 
Responsibility and Atonement (oxford: oxford university Press, 1989), chapters 1 and 8.
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which actions are good (that is, would be good if they were performed) 
are independent of the actions of agents, the fundamental principles to 
which propositions it is good to award the status of necessary truth will 
be independent of the actions of God. on the propositional view these 
will be eternally necessary propositions (stating which propositions it 
would be a good action to make necessary) existing independently of the 
actions of God, and determining which actions he can do. but then there 
will be necessarily true eternal propositions independent of the will of 
God stating which actions (of creating necessary truths) these are. These 
propositions determine how God can act; they cannot be consequences 
of God’s actions. but if necessary truths (including the fundamental 
moral truths) are just truths of human language about human language 
(including the truth about which property ‘morally good’ designates, 
and so which properties, such as the property of feeding the starving, are 
entailed by it), there are no pre-existing things apart from God – although 
of course the states of affairs which human language is used to describe 
– e.g. that God is good – may exist before they are described by humans.
so for all these reasons we should regard logical necessity as 
belonging primarily to human sentences, and only to any other entities 
as a  convenient fiction; and then, I  suggest, it follows that God is not 
a metaphysically necessary being (in the sense analysed in this paper), 
because it is not logically possible (in my sense) that there be any 
metaphysically necessary being.9 but this fact has no relevance to the 
9 I  very much doubt whether anyone earlier than Anselm thought that God is 
a  metaphysically necessary being in the sense being discussed. Aquinas did not use 
‘necessary being’ in this sense. For in his Summa Theologiae Ia. 50.5 ad. 3 (as elsewhere) 
he clearly implies that, as well as God, angels (which are beings created by the voluntary 
act of God) are also necessary beings. He seems to think of a necessary being as one not 
subject to corruption, that is, one which will go on existing forever unless caused not to 
exist by something else. He distinguished God from other necessary beings as a “being 
necessary through its own nature (per se) and not caused to be necessary by something 
else” (op. cit. Ia. 2.3) and so ‘unconditionally necessary’. Angels depend for their non-
corruptibility on God and so are only ‘conditionally necessary’. However Aquinas also 
seems to claim (in effect) that only self-contradictions are absolutely impossible. (“The 
impossible is that in which the predicate is incompatible with the subject” – op.cit. Ia. 
25.3.) That might seem to suggest that he thought that the negation of ‘there is a God’ 
entailed a contradiction, and so he did - but that was because he thought that anything 
incompatible with what was already fixed entailed a  contradiction; on his view what 
is absolutely possible changes with time. but God, as the eternal source of everything, 
is always fixed, and so – by Aquinas’s criteria - his non-existence is always impossible, 
and that is why he is absolutely necessary. (I am indebted for this analysis of Aquinas’s 
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logical possibility of there existing a being necessary in some other sense, 
e.g. a being essentially everlasting and essentially not causally contingent 
on the existence of any other being for its own existence, which is 
a property which all traditional theists have believed God to have. And 
this fact allows the possibility of there being a cogent inductive argument 
to the existence of such a being.10
understanding of modal concepts to brian leftow. see his paper ‘Aquinas, Divine 
simplicity, and Divine Freedom’ in [ed.] K. Timpe, Metaphysics and God [london: 
routledge, 2009], esp. pp. 23-29.) but this is not metaphysical necessity in the sense in 
which I have been discussing it, which derives from a sense of logical necessity in which 
‘entailing a contradiction’ is something intrinsic to a sentence (with its meaning), and 
independent of what is or is not already fixed outside the sentence. Admittedly, Aquinas 
also thought that “God is the same as his own nature or essence” (Ia.3.3); but he goes on 
to claim that anything immaterial, not just God, is the same as its own nature. His point 
is simply that material things are individuated by the matter of which they are made, 
whereas immaterial things are individuated by their forms, that is natures. I know of 
nothing in Aquinas which should lead us to suppose that he thought that God’s existence 
is a metaphysically necessary truth (in the sense used in this paper). He certainly thought 
that on Anselm’s ‘definition’ of God the negation of ‘There is a God’ did not entail a self-
contradiction (Ia. 2.1. ad. 2), and I know of no reason to suppose that he thought that this 
would hold on any other ‘definition’ (in our sense) of ‘God’.
10 For my own inductive arguments to the existence of God of this kind, see my The 
Existence of God, second edition (oxford: oxford university Press, 2004).
